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               Attention is a salient feature of human mentality, at least in its
          conscious manifestations.  Yet attention became a central topic in psychology
          only recently by comparison with such areas as sensory perception,
          imagination, or memory.  Descriptions of the chief phenomenal characteristics
          of attention were built up from classical antiquity to the seventeenth
          century.  But attention first became a chapter heading in standard psychology
          textbooks during the 1730s.
               This chronology has an air of paradox about it because it dates the
          entrance of attention into psychology prior to the commonly accepted dates for
          the origin of psychology itself.  The origin of natural scientific psychology
          is now typically dated to 1879, or to sometime in the two preceding decades.
          This dating reflects a certain perspective on "natural scientific psychology"
          that equates it with the experimental of psychology of Wundt and Titchener.
          If one takes a broader perspective, permitting the definitions of the terms
          "natural science" and "psychology" to vary across the historical past
          (according to their interpretation by past thinkers), then natural scientific
          psychology has a much longer history than is suggested by Ebbinghaus’ (1908,
          p. 1) celebrated phrase contrasting a "short history" with a "long past."
               It is from the perspective of this longer history that attention achieves
          chapter status in psychology textbooks only "recently," i.e. in the eighteenth
          century.  Part I sets this entrance, by sketching the historical contexts in
          which psychology has been considered to be a natural science.  Part II traces
          the construction of phenomenological descriptions of attention, and then
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          compares selected theoretical and empirical developments in the study of
          attention over three time slices: mid eighteenth century, turn of the
          twentieth century, and late twentieth century.  We shall find significant
          descriptive, theoretical, and empirical continuity when these developments are
          considered in the large.  This continuity is open to several interpretations,
          including the view that attention research shows long-term convergence because
          it is conditioned by the basic structure of attention as a natural phenomenon,
          and the less optimistic view that theory making in at least this area of
          psychology has been remarkably conservative when considered under large grain
          resolution, consisting in the reshuffling of a few core ideas.
                 I.  Attention and the Origin of Psychology as a Natural Science
               The historical development of psychology as a natural science has not
          been treated adequately in contemporary histories of psychology.  From the
          time of Boring (1929, 1950), such histories primarily have served the function
          of providing a strong identity for the discipline of experimental psychology.
          Boring and his followers (e.g., Schultz & Schultz 1987) have thus celebrated
          "foundings" and "founders," rather than explicitly posing and thoroughly
          investigating the question of whether scientific psychology should be seen as
          deriving primarily from the experimental psychology of Wundt and Titchener.
                                       _F_r_o_m _P_s_y_c_h_e _t_o _M_i_n_d
               If "psychology" is considered in its root meaning, as the "science of the
          soul" (_l_o_g_o_n _p_e_r_i _t_e_s _p_s_y_c_h_e_s), then it has been an autonomous discipline from
          the time of Aristotle’s treatise _D_e _A_n_i_m_a.  In Aristotelian terms, the literal
          meaning of the word "psychology" is the science of the soul (_p_s_y_c_h_e)
          considered to be a vital or animating principle, and hence to possess the so-
          called vegetative powers such as nutrition and growth.  When "psychology" is
          so understood, the study of the soul’s cognitive powers, including sense,
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          imagination, memory, and intellect, is a subdiscipline of it.  Within this
          Aristotelian subdiscipline, the emphasis was on providing a taxonomy of the
          cognitive powers, and of characterizing the "physical" or qualitative relation
          between object properties and sensory states that represent those properties.
          Study of the soul itself fell under the umbrella discipline of physics,
          considered as the science of nature in general, but this fact carried no
          materialistic or reductionistic implications.  Paradoxically from our point of
          view, quantitative investigations of vision, including discussions of the
          perception of size and distance, were carried out in the distinct discipline
          of optics, which did not fall under physics and whose subject matter was
          understood to be the complete "theory of vision" (Hatfield 1995).
               In the course of the seventeenth century the dominant Aristotelian
          conception of the soul was replaced, primarily by Cartesian dualism.
          Descartes effectively equated soul with mind.  He consequently redrew the line
          between "body" and "soul," so that the functions of the vegetative soul were
          assigned to purely material processes, the sensory functions were attributed
          to mind and body conjointly, and purely cognitive (and volitional) functions
          were assigned to the mind alone (Hatfield 1992).  Although this turn toward
          dualism is well known, less well known is that Descartes and his dualistic
          followers considered the immaterial mind to be a part of nature (Hatfield
          1994).  In particular, the influential Cartesians Le Grand (1694) and Regis
          (1691) explicitly placed the study of mental operations, including sense,
          imagination, and memory, under the rubric of "physics" (again conceived as the
          science of nature in general).  The notorious Cartesian interest in clear and
          distinct perception elicited several analyses of the phenomenology of
          cognition, featured the role of attention in the act of judgment, and
          especially in cases of allegedly self-evident cognition (Berlyne 1974).
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                      _A_t_t_e_n_t_i_o_n _i_n _t_h_e _I_n_d_e_p_e_n_d_e_n_t _D_i_s_c_i_p_l_i_n_e _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y
               During the eighteenth century "psychology" understood as the science of
          the mind was founded as an independent discipline.  There were professorships
          in psychology, textbooks were published, journals were started.  As it
          happens, none of the chief practitioners of this new science of mind were
          materialists or reductionists:  they were either dualists or were agnostic on
          ontology, adopting a position sometimes described as "empirical dualism"
          (Schmid 1796).  They sought "laws of the mind" by analogy with Newton’s laws
          of motion.  Among the proposed laws, the most widely accepted were the famous
          laws of association (such as the associative law of simultaneity, or that of
          resemblance).  Other explicitly stated laws pertained to memory: Christian
          Wolff, who apparently coined the word "psychometrics" (1738, #522, p. 403),
          proposed that "goodness of memory" can be estimated by such quantitative
          factors as: the temporary latency of response to a memory demand, the number
          of tries it takes to retrieve an item from memory, and the number of acts it
          takes to fix an item in memory (1738, #191, p. 131); however, none of these
          tests were operationalized in his textbook.  Wolff (1740) also formulated
          several generalizations concerning attention.  One described an inverse
          relation between the intensity of attention and the extent of the cognitive
          material that can be brought under it: the greater the attention, the smaller
          the part of the visual field to which it extends (#360).  Another contended
          that, with equally distributed attention, that part of a whole which otherwise
          is cognized most clearly will come to the fore (#367).  A third suggested that
          conscious attention serves the process of combining spatial representations
          and temporal processes into spatially and temporally ordered wholes (##380-5).
          These generalizations concerning memory and attention are formulated as
          proportions, but they were not accompanied by explicit quantitative data to
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          support this relation.
               Wolff’s discussions of attention mark its introduction into psychology as
          a major topic.  Comparison of the standard chapter headings from textbooks
          treating psychological topics supports this claim.  In Table 1, a summary of
          main topics from the seventeenth century works in the Aristotelian and
          Cartesian traditions is compared with a summary derived from surveying
          standard textbooks from around the turn of the present century (Ebbinghaus
          1911, James 1890, Ladd 1895, Wundt 1874).  Many of the topic areas are
          identical or closely equivalent:  the external senses, the physiology of
          nervous processes, the control of bodily motion, higher cognition, and
          appetite and will.  But within one area there was considerable change.
          Authors in the Aristotelian tradition, and immediate subsequent authors as
                                 -------------------------------
                                    Insert Table 1 about here.
                                 -------------------------------
          well, recognized "internal senses" in addition to the traditional five
          "external senses."  The "internal senses" included memory and imagination, as
          well as other cognitive powers or capacities.  Nineteenth century works
          continue to have chapters on memory and on imagination, but they contain two
          new chapters in comparison with the seventeenth century: chapters on
          association and on attention.  The latter topics received only scattered
          treatment in the seventeenth century, in connection with other headings,
          including the senses, reasoning, and judgment.  Wolff’s (1738) has a chapter
          on "attention and reflection," and his (1740) has one on "attention and
          intellect."  Other works soon appeared with separate sections on attention,
          including Bonnet (1755, ch. 38) and Abel (1786, pp. 81-106).
               Any adequate explanation of the increased attention to attention in the
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          eighteenth century would have to trace the discussion forward from seventeenth
          century treatises on logic and mind.  It is already known that impetus was
          given to the investigation of both attention itself and the empirical
          conditions in which it is exercised by the Cartesian doctrine that knowledge
          consists in clear and distinct ideas (Berlyne 1974).  Clarity and
          distinctness, as understood in this tradition, are phenomenal characteristics.
          One recognizes clarity and distinctness, and even increases it, by paying
          attention to one’s ideas.  Descartes (1642) brought clarity and distinctness
          to the forefront of his own analyses of knowledge and cognition.  The authors
          of the Port Royal _L_o_g_i_c drew upon this analysis (Arnauld & Nicole 1683, II.19.
          pp. 343, 363; VI.6, p. 422), and Malebranche (1980, I.18, VI.1.2-VI.2.1; pp.
          79-81, 411-439) extended it greatly.
               Careful study of the origin of attention as a topic in psychology would
          require a fuller examination of the development of psychology itself.  At
          present, we have little knowledge of the development of either the theoretical
          or experimental side of psychology prior to the latter part of the nineteenth
          century.  This means that we are lacking a good assessment of the relative
          roles of theory and experiment in the early development of psychology as an
          empirically based science.  Although it is no doubt true that new experimental
          techniques were introduced to psychology in the latter half of the nineteenth
          century, it is also true that the theoretical formulations extant at that time
          show significant continuity with the early nineteenth and even the eighteenth
          centuries.  Part II considers both empirical and theoretical continuity in the
          history of the psychology of attention.
                        II.  History of Research and Thinking on Attention
               Titchener (1908) credits the new "experimental psychology" with three
          achievements, the third being "the discovery of attention":  "What I mean by
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          the ’discovery’ of attention is the explicit formulation of the problem; the
          recognition of its separate status and fundamental importance; the realisation
          that the doctrine of attention is the nerve of the whole psychological system,
          and that as men judge of it, so shall they be judged before the tribunal of
          psychology" (1908, p. 173).  Titchener’s claim about the "discovery" of
          attention becomes less interesting if we focus on the rhetorical excesses of
          the third point, that "discovery" implies bringing attention to the center of
          the "whole psychological system."  If we just consider the first two points,
          Titchener’s claim is clearly false: attention was noticed and discussed in the
          ancient and medieval worlds, and, as we have seen, had been introduced into
          the discipline of psychology by the 1730s.  These developments can
          conveniently be traced under the rubrics of _p_h_e_n_o_m_e_n_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l descriptions of
          attention, _t_h_e_o_r_e_t_i_c_a_l analyses, and _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a_l investigations.
                            _P_h_e_n_o_m_e_n_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _d_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_o_n_s _o_f _a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o_n
               Neumann (1971) surveys the introduction of various descriptive or
          phenomenological characteristics of attention across the span of Greek, Roman,
          and European thought.  His remarkable results, summarized in Table 2, indicate
          that the primary attributes of attention had been recorded by the seventeenth
          century.  We need not endorse his taxonomy of attention fully; although it
          provides a reasonably comprehensive description of the conscious
          manifestations of attention, it also mixes the nonphenomenal category of
          "effector sensitivity" with descriptive categories, and it fails to note
          phenomenal reports of involuntary shifts of attention as a descriptive
          category (an added item in Table 2).  Nor should we suppose that in every case
          he is correct in identifying the "first" mention of each of these aspects
          (often he is not).  His findings provide a listing of early descriptions of
          the main conscious or phenomenal manifestations of attention, showing that _a_t
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          _t_h_e _l_a_t_e_s_t the main features had been recorded by the seventeenth century.  We
          shall consider these attributes one by one.
                                 -------------------------------
                                    Insert Table 2 about here.
                                 -------------------------------
               _N_a_r_r_o_w_i_n_g (_E_n_g_e_a_s_p_e_k_t).  This first aspect of attention attributes it a
          narrow scope, such that stimuli are in competition to be perceived.  Neumann
          attributes this observation to Aristotle, who did not speak explicitly of
          attention, but who raised the following question about sense perception:
          "assuming, as is natural, that of two movements the stronger always tends to
          extrude the weaker, is it possible or not that one should be able to perceive
          two objects simultaneously in the same individual time?" (1984, ch. 7,
          447a11-14).  That Aristotle had in mind the phenomena of attention is made
          clear when he continues: "The above assumption explains why persons do not
          perceive what is brought before their eyes, if they are at the time deep in
          thought, or in a fright, or listening to some loud noise."  Aristotle accepts
          the assumption that the stronger sensory stimulus does indeed tend to extrude
          the weaker, but he does not conclude that therefore two objects cannot be
          perceived simultaneously.  For, he observes, we can perceive white and sweet
          at the same time (449a11-19).  He seems to have held, however, that only one
          object is perceived at one time by the same sense (e.g., vision).  But in this
          case, the presence of weaker stimuli affects the distinctness with which the
          stronger one is perceived:  "If, then, the greater movement tends to expel the
          less, it necessarily follows that, when they occur, this greater should itself
          too be less distinctly perceptible than if it were alone" (447a22-24).  In any
          event, Aristotle fixed the question of whether there can be a single
          perceptual response to simultaneous stimuli, and hence of the scope of sensory
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          awareness, in the literature of psychology for subsequent millennea.
               _A_c_t_i_v_e _D_i_r_e_c_t_i_n_g (_T_a_e_t_i_g_k_e_i_t_s_a_s_p_e_k_t).  Neumann credits Lucretius (1st c.
          B.C.) with the observation that human cognizers actively direct attention.
          Lucretius made two related points regarding the phenomenology of the mind’s
          activity in sense perception.  First, he observed things are not seen sharply,
          "save those for which the mind has prepared itself" (1965/1967, IV.803-804).
          Thus, "do you not see that our eyes, when they begin to look at something that
          is tenuous, make themselves intent (_c_o_n_t_e_n_d_e_r_e) and ready, and that, unless
          they do this, it is not possible for us to see clearly (_c_e_r_n_e_r_e _a_c_u_t_e)?"
          (IV.808-810).  Intentness and readiness, clearly activities of mind and not
          simply external orientings of the sense organs, result in some things being
          seen rather than, or more clearly than, others.  But, second, the mind can
          alter its perception of things already at hand by directing its perception:
          "Even in things that are plainly visible you can note that if you do not
          direct the mind (_a_d_v_e_r_t_a_s _a_n_i_m_u_m), the things are, so to speak, far removed
          and remote for the whole time" (IV.811-813).  Consequently, Lucretius calls
          for "attentive (_a_t_t_e_n_t_a) ears and mind" when he gives a long explanation
          (VI.920).  In both of the cases described, the mind (_a_n_i_m_u_s) actively directs
          (_a_d_v_e_r_t_e_r_e) its perceiving toward objects of perception, whether these objects
          are merely anticipated (first case), or are present at the time.  This "active
          directing" clearly implies the _v_o_l_u_n_t_a_r_y preparation of or direction of the
          mind in attending to objects of perception, and in the anticipatory case, is
          an an early description of a _p_r_i_m_i_n_g _e_f_f_e_c_t (Johnston & Dark, 1987), though
          Lucretius did not use either of these terms.
               Though Aristotle did not use cognates for "attention" and Lucretius did
          so rarely, several cognate terms were entrenched in Latin vocabulary by the
          mid first century B.C.  These included _a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o and related words, _i_n_t_e_n_t_i_o,
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          straining or directing the mind toward something or concentrating the mind on
          something, and _a_n_i_m_a_d_v_e_r_s_i, turning the mind toward, noticing something
          (Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 132-133, 200, 938).  Cicero (mid 1st c.
          B.C.) used these words regularly in his writings, including his work on
          oration, in which he, e.g., opined that "with verse equal attention
          (_a_t_t_e_n_d_e_r_e) is given to the beginning and middle and end of a line" (1968,
          III.192).  The Greek word for attention, _p_r_o_s_e_k_t_i_k_o_n, apparently became common
          as the name of a faculty only with the writings of John Philoponus (6th c.,
          see Hamilton 1895, p. 945).
               _I_n_v_o_l_u_n_t_a_r_y _S_h_i_f_t_s.  Neumann credits Augustine of Hippo (354-430) with
          fixing terms cognate with "attention" (_a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o, _i_n_t_e_n_t_i_o) into the technical
          vocabulary used to analyze cognition.  In a work on music Augustine discusses
          the role of attention or alertness in perception generally (1969, VI.5.9), and
          in the perception of musical phrases (VI.8.20-21).  He describes the
          functioning of attention in religious experience (1991/1992), including cases
          in which attention is to be voluntarily directed (1991/1992, III.11.19,
          X.40.65), and he recognizes that attention can be involuntarily drawn.
          Augustine describes not only cases in which one is drawn toward objects of
          sensory pleasure, but also those in which objects of cognitive interest "tug
          at" one’s attention (1991/1992, X.35.56). Augustine thus described involuntary
          shifts in attention (without using the term "involuntary"), implicitly
          contrasting them with cases of voluntary control.
               _C_l_a_r_i_t_y (_K_l_a_r_h_e_i_t_s_a_s_p_e_k_t).  Neumann credits Jean Buridan (14th c.) with
          the observation that simultaneous apprehension of more than one object
          decreases the clarity with which any of them is represented.  Passages quoted
          above show that a relation between attention and clarity had been suggested
          earlier by Aristotle and Lucretius.  Buridan (1518) presented a more varied
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          description of this relation, using the terms "perfection" and "distinctness"
          to describe the dimension of perceptual cognition affected by stimulus
          plurality.  Where Aristotle observed that the simultaneous presence of several
          objects reduces the clarity with which the "strongest" alone is perceived, and
          where Lucretius noted that attention or mental preparedness can increase
          clarity of perception, Buridan remarked that the relation between distinctness
          and plurality varies.  For a single object that is very large and wide, a
          lesser part of it is clearly visible though the whole is not, because it
          extends beyond of the field of view.  But for a middle-sized object near at
          hand, the whole may well be more clearly perceived than its many parts.  And
          in some cases, though we perceive the presence of many objects, we perceive
          them less clearly than if only one of them were present (Buridan 1518, qu. 21,
          fol. 39v).
               _F_i_x_a_t_i_o_n (_F_i_x_i_e_r_u_n_g_s_a_s_p_e_k_t).  In the seventeenth century, Descartes
          (1596-1650) described more fully the _T_a_e_t_i_g_k_e_i_t_s_a_s_p_e_k_t of attention by clearly
          distinguishing between the voluntary fixation of attention and involuntary
          shifts.  As had Augustine, he noted that attention may be involuntarily drawn
          to things.  He described cases in which attention is drawn to what is novel, a
          phenomenon he attributed to the emotion of wonder: "Wonder is a sudden
          surprise of the soul which brings it to consider with attention the objects
          that seem to it unusual and extraordinary" (1985, #70).  In such cases,
          attention is not under voluntary control, but is simply drawn to the novel
          thing.  The mind can, all the same, choose to stay fixed on one object:  "when
          we want to fix our attention for some time on some particular object," this
          volition causes physiological changes that maintain the relevant physiological
          state of the brain (#43), and that "serve to keep the sense organs fixed in
          the same orientation so that they will continue to maintain the impression in
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          the way in which they formed it" (#70).  We can also voluntarily fix our
          attention on mental contents in order better to remember something (#75).
          Finally, the mind or soul can avoid noticing some new things by fixing
          attention on others: "The soul can prevent itself from hearing a slight noise
          or feeling a slight pain by attending very closely to some other thing, but it
          cannot in the same way prevent itself from hearing thunder or feeling fire
          that burns the hand" (#46).  Descartes here posits a balance between the power
          of fixation and the strength of involuntary changes in attention.  He
          indicates that within limits we can retain our fixation, but that these limits
          can be surpassed by loud stimuli, and presumably by strikingly novel stimuli.
          Malebranche added that it is functionally appropriate that sensory materials
          should attract our attention, because "the senses represent objects as
          present," and "it is fitting that of several good or evils proposed to the
          soul, those present should affect and occupy it more than absent ones, because
          the soul must decide quickly what it should do about them" (Malebranche 1980,
          I.18, pp. 79-80).  The positions of Descartes and Malebranche presuppose a
          limited span of consciousness (_E_n_g_e_a_s_p_e_k_t), the contents of which are subject
          to alteration by voluntary or involuntary shifts in attention (see also Locke
          1975, II.19.3).
               Later authors, including Wolff (1738, #237) and Stewart (1793, p. 113),
          describe cases in a cognizer can track one phenomenon, such as a conversation,
          while ignoring other sensory objects.  Stewart argues that the ability to
          switch at will between two present conversations implies that the untracked
          conversation must be represented:
               When two persons are speaking to us at once, we can attend to either
               of them at pleasure, without being much disturbed by the other.  If
               we attempt to listen to both, we can understand neither.  The fact
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               seems to be, that when we attend constantly to one of the speakers,
               the words spoken by the other make no impression on the memory, in
               consequence of our not attending to them; and affect us as little as
               if they had not been uttered.  This power, however, of the mind to
               attend to either speaker at pleasure, supposes that it is, at one
               and the same time, conscious of the sensations which both produce.
               (Stewart 1793, p. 113)
          Stewart’s suggestion that the unattended conversation is still present in
          conscious, though unnoticed, is related to the more recent distinction between
          automatic and controlled processing in relation to selective attention
          (Johnston & Dark 1987).  Stewart (1793, ch. 2) discusses a version of the
          latter distinction at great length in connection with the role of attention in
          memory fixation, and in connection with the conscious, voluntary control of
          cognitive or motor tasks that later become habitual or automatic (though he
          counsels against use of the latter term).
               The ability to track either of two conversations implies the ability to
          shift attention without an accompanying change in the orientation or direction
          of the body or sense organs.  Such a possibility was implied by earlier
          descriptions, from Aristotle on, of cases in which a person does not notice
          what is in front of him or her: in those cases, a person might attend to first
          one sequence of thoughts and then another, or switch from internal reverie to
          attend to a sound, while the gaze remains fixed (and  blank).  Wolff (1738,
          #256) provides the first explicit notice I have found of the ability to shift
          visual attention among the parts of a fixed perceptual representation without
          changing the total representation.  He describes perceiving a whole tree
          (presumably in one glance, standing at some distance), and then shifting
          attention from leaves to branches to trunk; or perceiving a single leaf, and
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          shifting attention from its shape to its color.  It is not clear from these
          descriptions that Wolff envisioned a genuine decoupling of attention from the
          axis of vision, and he elsewhere maintained that the two are strongly coupled
          (1740, ##358-364).
               _E_f_f_e_c_t_o_r _S_e_n_s_i_t_i_v_i_t_y (_E_f_f_e_k_t_o_r_i_s_c_h_e_r _A_s_p_e_k_t).  The effectoric aspect
          attributes to attention the power of making it "easier" for the sense organs
          (or effectors) to receive an impression.  There are two factors here that
          should be kept distinct.  Originally, some thinkers observed that one can
          prepare to perceive an expected object, through mental concentration and by
          pointing mobile sense organs, such as the eyes, in the proper direction.
          Although Neumann credits this observation to Descartes, it can be found much
          earlier in Lucretius’ remark about intentness and readiness, quoted above.  A
          second effectoric aspect arises with the hypothesis that attention can affect
          the sensitivity of the sensory receptors or nerves themselves.  Strictly
          speaking, this is not a merely phenomenal-descriptive aspect of attention,
          because it posits hypothetical physiological changes in sensory effectors or
          nerves to explain how attention affects sensory acuteness (otherwise, the
          _E_f_f_e_k_t_o_r_i_s_c_h_e_r _A_s_p_e_k_t would not differ from the _K_l_a_r_h_e_i_t_s_a_s_p_e_k_t).  This
          hypothesis about effector sensitivity is not found in the passage Neumann
          cites from Descartes (#70) nor elsewhere in Descartes’ works; Descartes simply
          claims that fixation of attention can keep the sense organs steadily pointed
          at a target object.
               Specific mention of heightened sensitivity in the sensory nerves is found
          in the eighteenth century work of Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), a Swiss
          naturalist.  Bonnet (1769) described a situation in which he was paying
          attention to one object among several, each of he assumed to be simultaneously
          affecting the sense organs with equal force: "Induced by some motive to give
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          my attention to one of these objects, I fix my eyes on it.  The perception of
          that object immediately becomes more lively:  the perceptions of the
          neighboring objects become weaker.  Soon I discover particularities in that
          object that previously escaped me.  To the extent my attention increases, the
          impressions of the object become stronger and augment.  Finally, all this
          increases to such a point that I am scarcely affected except by that object"
          (1769, #138).  Bonnet goes on to explain that the liveliness of a sense
          perception is expected to vary in direct proportion with the "movement" or
          activation of sensory nerves, and since in this case each of several objects
          is assumed to affect the nerves with the same force, the increased liveliness
          of the perception of the target object must be due to an increase in the
          activation of the relevant nerves owing to the influence of the mind upon them
          in accordance with the fixation of attention (ibid., ##139-141).  He also
          produced a physiological explanation, involving the redirection of limited
          neurophysiological resources, for the reciprocal relation he described between
          the strengthened perception of the target object and the weakened perception
          of neighboring objects (ibid., #142).
               _M_o_t_i_v_a_t_i_o_n_a_l _A_s_p_e_c_t (_M_o_t_i_v_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_e_n _A_s_p_e_k_t).  Neumann credits Leibniz
          (1646-1716) with having introduced motivational factors to the description of
          attention, citing a passage in which Leibniz observes that "we exercise
          attention on objects which we pick out in preference to others" (Leibniz,
          1981, II.19.1).  Indication that one object can be picked out in preference to
          others through attention is found earlier in Augustine’s mention of the
          voluntary direction of attention, and in Descartes’ discussion of fixation,
          and perhaps implicitly in Lucretius’ discussion of mental preparedness.
               _O_v_e_r_v_i_e_w.  Some sense of how comprehensively these descriptions cover the
          domain may be gained by comparing them with a survey of the chief "processes"
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          of attention (Parasuraman & Davies 1984) or "manifestations" of attention
          (LaBerge 1995) described in recent reviews.  Parasuraman and Davies found that
          attention researchers had described three chief processes in attention:
          _s_e_l_e_c_t_i_v_e, _i_n_t_e_n_s_i_v_e, and _a_l_e_r_t_i_n_g _a_n_d _s_u_s_t_a_i_n_i_n_g (1984, pp. xii-xiii).  To a
          first approximation, their selective process corresponds to the Active
          Directing category, intensive to the combined Narrowing and Clarity
          categories, and alerting and sustaining to a combination of Involuntary
          Shifts, Effector Sensitivity, and Fixation.  LaBerge (1995, pp. 12-13) lists
          _s_e_l_e_c_t_i_v_e, _p_r_e_p_a_r_a_t_o_r_y, and _m_a_i_n_t_e_n_a_n_c_e manifestations of attention, which
          correspond respectively to the Narrowing and Active Directing, Effector
          Sensitivity, and Fixation categories.
                                _T_h_e_o_r_e_t_i_c_a_l _a_n_a_l_y_s_e_s _o_f _a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o_n
               The phenomenal descriptions of attention in the previous section are
          comparatively theory-free:  they impose a descriptive vocabulary on the
          phenomena of attention, by classifying attentional acts as voluntary or
          involuntary, by relating attention to limitations on the momentary scope of
          sensory awareness, and by relating attention to phenomenal clarity and
          distinctness.  Terms such as "voluntary" or "phenomenal clarity" are not, of
          course, theory neutral.  Still, the descriptive vocabulary used in the
          previous section, save for the invocation of Effector Sensitivity and related
          hypothetical physiological mechanisms, does not engage in the theoretical
          activity of positing explanatory mechanisms or structures to account for the
          observed attentional phenomena.  Moreover, the instances in which these
          descriptive categories were used arose in a variety of intellectual contexts,
          none of which, with the exception of Bonnet’s work, involved a systematic
          examination of the attentional capacities of the human mind.
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               The ancients and early moderns did on occasion discuss theoretical
          frameworks for understanding attention.  John Philoponus provides an early
          discussion of the concept of attention itself, considered as a lynchpin for
          all cognition.  In his commentary on Aristotle’s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, III.2, he favorably
          reviews the following position, attributed to "recent interpreters" of
          Aristotle:
               The attention, they say, assists in all that goes on in man.  It is
               that which pronounces _I _u_n_d_e_r_s_t_a_n_d, _I _t_h_i_n_k, _I _o_p_i_n_e, _I _r_e_s_e_n_t, _I
               _d_e_s_i_r_e.  The attentive function of the rational soul, in fact,
               pervades in all the powers without exception--the rational, the
               irrational, the vegetative.  If then, they proceed, the attentive
               faculty be thus thorough-going, why not let it accompany the
               sensations and pronounce of them, _I _s_e_e, _I _h_e_a_r, etc.? for to do
               this is the peculiar office of what is recognisant of the several
               energies.  If, therefore, it be the attention which pronounces this,
               attention will be the power which takes note of the energies of
               sense.  For it behoves that what takes note of all should itself be
               indivisible and _o_n_e; seeing also at the same time that the subject
               of all these operations, _M_a_n, is one.  For, if this faculty took
               cognisance of these objects, that faculty of those others, it would
               be, as he himself [Aristotle] elsewhere says, as if you perceived
               that, I this.  That, therefore, must be one to which the attentive
               function pertains; for this function is conversant with the
               faculties--both the cognitive and the vital.  In so far as it is
               conversant with the cognitive energies it is called Attention.  (As
               translated in Hamilton 1895, p. 942)
          Attention is assigned the function of unifying human consciousness, by "taking
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          cognisance" of the materials provided by the various senses.  Attention is not
          here portrayed as selecting, but rather as uniting and hence delimiting the
          momentary cognitive contents of any individual cognizer.
               Although Philoponus assigned theoretical centrality to attention in the
          analysis of cognition, extended theoretical analysis of attention apparently
          did not soon become common.  From antiquity through the seventeenth century, I
          have found that attention received the kind of hit-and-miss notice chronicled
          in the sequence of phenomenal-descriptive observations.  Such theoretical
          analysis as did occur arose primarily in the contexts of applying terms and
          concepts developed elsewhere to the description of attention, of drawing
          variously phenomenally-based distinctions, such as that between involuntary
          and voluntary attention, or of discussing the function of attention.
               With the development of psychology as an independent science in the
          eighteenth century, attention came under more systematic theoretical and
          empirical scrutiny.  In Wolff’s psychology textbooks from the 1730s attention
          was defined as the "faculty of bringing it about that in a perception
          compounded from parts, one part has greater clarity than the others" (1738,
          #237).  What theoretical order Wolff brought to attention came in his chosen
          dimensions of empirical analysis.  Having chosen cognitive clarity as the
          primary affect of attention, he set about to analyze the conditions under
          which clarity occurs.  He found that attention to merely imagined
          representations is impeded by simultaneous sensory stimulation (#238), that
          attention to such representations is more easily conserved when fewer things
          act on the external senses (#240), that it is easier to attend to one image
          than to several (#241).  He distinguished several dimensions in which
          attention admits of degree, including: _i_n_t_e_n_s_i_t_y (not his term), attention is
          greater if it is harder to distract (#243); _l_o_n_g_e_v_i_t_y, attention may last for
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          longer or shorter periods (#244); _e_x_t_e_n_s_i_o_n, one may be able to pay attention
          to one or to several objects at once (#245); _v_o_l_u_n_t_a_r_y _c_o_n_t_r_o_l, attention may
          be more or less subject to voluntary control (#246), and so on.  In his
          (1740), Wolff continued the same sort of analysis, now focusing largely on the
          relation between the direction of the visual axis and the focus of attention,
          describing the movement of the eyes in relation to voluntary attention and
          involuntary shifts of attention (##358-365).  He speculated on the
          physiological conditions accompanying and affecting attention (##374-378), and
          he formulated the generalizations about attention mentioned in Part I.
               After Wolff, the literature on attention in the eighteenth century
          virtually exploded.  This large literature has been the subject of a
          monographic study by Braunschweiger (1899), which remains useful.
          Braunschweiger analyzed the theoretical dimensions of this literature into
          several categories.  The literature divided attention into _s_e_n_s_o_r_y and
          _i_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t_u_a_l dimensions: attention can select among external objects available
          for perception, but it can also direct "inner" cognitive states such as
          imagination and memory, or "inner" cognitive processes such as self-reflection
          or self-observation (1899, pp. 25-31).  In connection with this discussion,
          thinkers took various stances on the essence of attention itself (pp. 31-36),
          treating it either as a causal-explanatory factor in its own right, or as a
          phenomenon needing to be explained.  Some treated attention as a _f_a_c_u_l_t_y
          (i.e., as a mechanism that exists even when it is not in use), others as
          _m_e_n_t_a_l _e_f_f_o_r_t (i.e., as an activity of mind that exists only in its exercise),
          others as a _s_t_a_t_e _o_f _m_i_n_d (i.e., as a quality of sensations or perceptions,
          such as clarity).  In the first two cases, attention is the result of causal
          agency; in the latter, it is an attribute of experience.
               Braunschweiger (1899) analyzed eighteenth-century discussions along
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          several other dimensions, which are: degrees of attention, which extended
          Wolff’s treatment; the stimulus to involuntary attention and the control
          exercised in voluntary attention; the physiological correlate of attention;
          the effects of attention, from sensory acuity to memory and higher cognition;
          the means of improving attention; and limitations on or hindrances to
          attention.  Throughout Braunschweiger’s analysis, the primary theoretical
          results are manifested in taxonomies of the dimensions of variation in and
          conditions on the exercise of attention.
               The main dimensions of theoretical variation attributed by Parasuraman
          and Davies (1984) and Johnston and Dark (1987) to late twentieth-century
          theories can be located within eighteenth-century discussions.  Parasuraman
          and Davies found three main theoretical tendencies at work:  the view of
          attention as a selective mechanism, the analysis of attention in terms of
          processing resource allocation, and the distinction between automatic and
          attentional processing.  Wolff (1738) defined attention as a selectional
          process operating over degrees of clarity, though subject to both voluntary
          and involuntary control.  As we have seen, Bonnet (1769, #142) explained the
          reciprocal relation between strengthened representation of a target object and
          weakened representation of neighboring objects by postulating that limited
          neurophysiological resource must be allocated, with consequences for
          subsequent perceptual representation.  Finally, the distinction between
          processes that are under the control of voluntary attention and those that
          occur without even being noticed was commonplace in eighteenth century
          psychology, partly as a result of the postulation of unnoticed and hence
          automatic inferential processes to explain size and distance perception
          (forerunners of unconscious inference, on which see Hatfield 1990, chs. 2, 4,
          5).  Stewart reviews this distinction in the eighteenth century literature
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          (1793, ch. 2).  Johnston and Dark (1987, pp. 66-70, citing James 1890) divide
          twentieth-century theories into those that see attention as a cause, as
          opposed to those that see it merely as an effect.  In Braunschweiger’s (1899)
          terms, the _f_a_c_u_l_t_y and _m_e_n_t_a_l _e_f_f_o_r_t positions correspond to the former
          classification, the _s_t_a_t_e _o_f _m_i_n_d position to the latter.
                              _E_m_p_i_r_i_c_a_l _i_n_v_e_s_t_i_g_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_f _a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o_n
               It would be arbitrary to seek a firm dividing line between _p_h_e_n_o_m_e_n_a_l
          _d_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_o_n_s of aspects of attention and _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a_l _i_n_v_e_s_t_i_g_a_t_i_o_n_s proper.  To
          suppose that the latter must involve experiment would only push the problem
          back one step, as the concept of experimentation has itself undergone
          considerable development since the rise of modern science.  If we adopted too
          stringent an attitude toward experiment--say, restricting it to the standards
          of mid-twentieth-century journals of experimental psychology--we would be
          faced with the paradoxical result that much of Helmholtz’s and Wundt’s work on
          visual perception, as indeed much of Newton’s work in optics, does not count
          as experiment.  Consequently, here I will focus the discussion of empirical
          investigations on those empirical claims from the eighteenth century that are
          presented as part of a systematic scientific treatment of attention.  My main
          primary sources will be Wolff’s (1738, 1740), Bonnet’s (1755), and Abel’s
          (1786) eighteenth-century textbook treatments of attention and its empirical
          laws.  As a standard of comparison with traditional experimental psychology, I
          return to Titchener’s (1908) review of the results of the "new psychology" of
          the late nineteenth century, which will, to fix referents, be coordinated with
          the recent reviews of Johnston and Dark (1987), Kinchla (1992), and LaBerge
          (1995).
               Titchener organized his review of the experimental psychology of
          attention around seven empirical "laws," or general (though not strictly
                                              - 22 -
          universal) "statements of the behaviour of conscious contents given in the
          state of attention" (1908, p. 211).  The first law states that "_c_l_e_a_r_n_e_s_s _i_s
          _a_n _a_t_t_r_i_b_u_t_e _o_f _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n, which, within certain limits, may be varied
          independently of other concurrent attributes" (ibid.).  Titchener takes this
          independence to be well confirmed for most attributes, though he cites
          considerable controversy with respect to intensity, finally concluding that
          clearness can vary independently of intensity (loud and soft sounds can be
          equally clear), but that clearness can affect intensity (an attended, and
          hence "clear" sensation may seem to differ less than stimulus intensity would
          suggest from an unattended, hence unclear, sensation produced by a tone of
          greater intensity).  Earlier, Wolff held that we can voluntarily shift
          attention and hence affect the clarity of perceptions that otherwise would not
          be clear (1738, ##236-237).  Bonnet, as quoted above, states a relationship
          between attention and the "liveliness" of perceptions, with their other
          qualities presumed to remain the same, and Abel (1786, #195) maintains that
          attention can be varied at will to affect the clarity of sensory
          representations.  Clarity is only rarely mentioned in recent discussions of
          attention (e.g., LaBerge 1995, p. 27).  The related notion of accuracy in
          perceptual judgment, usually not stated in phenomenal-descriptive terms,
          remains central (LaBerge 1995, p. 9).
               Titchener’s second law is the "law of two levels," which accepts that
          "increased clearness of any one part-contents of consciousness implies the
          decreased clearness of all the rest," and asserts that only two "levels or
          degrees of clearness may coexist in the same consciousness" (1908, p. 220).
          Titchener reviews several opinions, including those that posit three or four
          levels of clearness, and sides with those that posit only two: focal
          attention, and what is outside it.  (He confounds figure/ground reversal with
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          clarity of representation in arguing for his position: 1908, pp. 228-229.)
          Eighteenth-century opinion was divided on this question.  Wolff did not
          address it directly, but _d_e _f_a_c_t_o he spoke only of the focus of attention
          (which in vision may be larger or smaller, inversely with the degree of
          attention) and what is outside it (1740, #360), though in other contexts he
          allowed that attention may be divided among several objects, without stating
          whether each target has equal clarity (1738, #245).  Bonnet (1755, pp. 130-
          131) asserted an "infinity" of degrees of attention.  In an example from
          vision, he described these degrees as falling off continuously from the center
          of the visual field to the boundary of peripheral vision.  Abel observed that
          attention can be directed on one object, or it can divided among several,
          presumably in different degrees as the ideas themselves are livelier or more
          pleasant (1786, ##213, 237-241; see also Schmid 1796, pp. 324-325).  Recent
          spotlight metaphors suggest a two-level division (Johnston & Dark 1986, pp.
          50-56), though LaBerge interpets the zoom-lens metaphor as permitting a
          gradation (1995, p. 27).  The conception of attention as a processing resource
          that can be allocated to one or more spatial positions in differing amounts is
          consistent with multiple levels of attention (Kinchla 1992, pp. 712-713).
               Titchener’s gives two laws in the third instance, both pertaining to the
          temporal relations of attention (1908, pp. 242-247).  The _l_a_w _o_f _a_c_c_o_m_m_o_d_a_t_i_o_n
          concerns the relation between cuing and reaction time: it takes a certain
          period (1-1.5 sec) to focus attention once cued; reaction time improves with
          cuing.  The _l_a_w _o_f _i_n_e_r_t_i_a states that it is more pleasing, or easier, to hold
          attention on one object than to shift it.  Eighteenth-century literature does
          not contain reaction-time results, and so has no correlate to the first of
          these laws.  As for the ease or difficulty of shifting attention, Wolff (1738,
          ##246-247) observed that in some instances attention tends to wander, and the
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          problem is keeping it in place, and Abel (1786, #214) listed a number of
          conditions that affect the duration of attention.
               Titchener’s fourth is the "law of prior entry," according to which "the
          stimulus for which we are predisposed requires less time than a like stimulus,
          for which we are unprepared, to produce its full conscious effect" (1908, p.
          251).  Although observation of the connection between attention and mental
          preparedness goes back at least to Lucretius, the eighteenth century made no
          advances here that I have found.  In recent literature, the correlate to
          Titchener’s _a_c_c_o_m_m_o_d_a_t_i_o_n and _p_r_i_o_r _e_n_t_r_y is the _p_r_i_m_i_n_g _e_f_f_e_c_t, which has
          been studied extensively (Johnston & Dark 1986, pp. 46-47; Kinchla 1992, pp.
          724-733), along with the notion of attention as _p_r_e_p_a_r_a_t_o_r_y to perception
          (LaBerge 1995, pp. 12-13).
               Titchener’s fifth is the "law of limited range," which says that for
          brief (tachistoscopic) exposures of objects within the scope of clear vision,
          "a practiced observer is able to cognise from four to six of them ’by a single
          act of attention’" (1908, pp. 260-261).  In the eighteenth century this
          question was not posed in connection with tachistoscopic presentation.  The
          earlier question concerned the number of objects that can be held in clear
          consciousness, apperceived, or attended to, at one time.  Opinions were
          divided.  Krueger held that through attention the understanding is able to
          make just one of its representations clearer at a time (1756, pp. 228-229).
          Bonnet tested the question by seeing how many objects he could imagine at one
          time.  He reported: "I find considerable variety in this connection, but in
          general the number is only five or six.  I attempt, for example, to represent
          to myself a figure with five or six sides, or simply to represent five or six
          points; I see that I imagine five distinctly:  I have difficulty going to six.
          It is perhaps true that regularity in the position of these lines or points
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          greatly relieves the imagination, and helps it to go higher" (1755, p. 132).
               The task of determining how many items can be cognized clearly at one
          time was pursued with relative continuity over a period of two hundred years.
          In the 1830s the Scottish philosopher and psychologist William Hamilton
          proposed the following experiment to answer the question: "If you throw a
          handful of marbles on the floor, you will find it difficult to view at once
          more than six, or seven at most, without confusion; but if you group them into
          twos, or threes, or fives, you can comprehend as many groups as you can
          units....You may perform the experiment also by an act of imagination" (1859,
          p. 177).  Hamilton controlled for time by fixing the onset of the task and
          operating under instructions that the number of marbles must be taken in "at
          once," that is, in one cognitive act.  Later in the century, Jevons (1871)
          performed a similar experiment by throwing various quantities of black beans
          into a shallow round paper box and estimating their number as soon as they
          came to rest.  His results, originally reported in _N_a_t_u_r_e, are shown in Table
          3.  He concludes that since a 5% error rate was obtained when the number of
          beans reached five, the proper figure for the limit of correct numerical
          estimation by a "single act of mental attention" is four.  In the mid
          twentieth century Kaufman, Lord, Reese, and Volkmann (1949) studied the
          discrimination of visual number using dots projected on a large screen,
          varying the instructions for either speed and accuracy.  They found no errors
          for two, three, or four dots.  For both accuracy and speed instructions, error
          began at five dots; the errors were fewer for accuracy instructions and
          reaction time longer.  Kaufman et al. also reported reaction times from a
          similar experiment by Saltzman and Garner (1948), which showed that the times
          increase monotonically as the number of stimuli is increased from 2 to 10.
          Following Saltzman and Garner, they concluded that there is no such thing as a
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          single "span of apprehension" or capacity of momentary cognition.  Hence, they
          did not present their findings as bearing on attention, but they focused
          instead on the judgment of numerousness itself, and coined the term
          "subitizing" for cases in which number is determined "suddenly" (1949, p.
          520).  This "subitizing" literature is not commonly included in current
          discussions of attention.  However, a correlate of Titchener’s fifth law, and
          of the question posed by Bonnet, Hamilton, and Jevons, occurs in recent
          literature through comparisons of attention to a bottleneck (LaBerge 1995, p.
          34).
                                 -------------------------------
                                    Insert Table 3 about here.
                                 -------------------------------
               Titchener’s sixth is the "law of temporal instability," which says that
          attention is unstable in itself.  Titchener cites Wundt to the effect that
          attention is constantly broken, from moment to moment (1908, p. 263).
          However, Titchener himself considered the estimate of two to three minutes for
          the self-limiting duration of focused attention to be conservative (p. 268).
          Wolff (1738, #244) noted that the ability to hold attention fixed varies from
          individual to individual, without giving a temporal estimate.  Recent
          empirical work discusses this topic under the rubric of _s_u_s_t_a_i_n_e_d _a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o_n,
          or the _d_u_r_a_t_i_o_n _o_f _a_t_t_e_n_t_i_o_n (LaBerge 1995, pp. 35-38); these findings suggest
          a duration on the order of hundreds of milliseconds.
               Seventh and finally, Titchener expresses the wish that there were a law
          for measuring the "degree of clearness" or the degree of attention.  Finding
          no single measure extant, he discusses several candidates, including the
          affect of distractors on some measure of performance (such as errors in a
          well-practiced sensory discrimination task).  Other proposed measures of
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          "attentional degree" or "attentional capacity" include measures of
          simultaneous range of attention (cf. law five), the affect of attention on
          sensory discrimination (cf. law four), the affect of attention on the
          formation of associations, and finally its affect on reaction time (1908, pp.
          279-280).  In the eighteenth century Wolff discussed several measures of
          degree of attention, including ease of distraction, capacity, and duration
          (1738, ##243-245).  Contemporary work assesses various dimensions of attention
          through sophisticated measures of performance characteristics such as reaction
          time and performance error (Kinchla 1992).
               These comparisons suggest that there is both continuity and divergence
          across the past 250 years of attention research: continuity at the global
          levels of theoretical conceptions and main dimensions of analysis,
          discontinuity in the development of sophisticated instrumentation for testing
          reaction time (late nineteenth century) and sophisticated approaches to
          measuring the fine-grained spatial and temporal characteristics of attention-
          based and unattended processing (twentieth century).  As elsewhere in
          psychology, current work on attention tends to be fragmented: there are
          traditions of work on attention as a selective mechanism (which might be early
          or late, voluntary or involuntary), as allocation processing resources, and as
          something to be contrasted with automatic processing.  Within these
          theoretical traditions, elaborate flow-chart models are being developed and
          tested.  New empirical questions have arisen concerning the extent to which
          semantic as opposed to simple physical dimensions of stimuli are processed
          outside the focus of attention.  New neural imaging techniques now make it
          possible to track the neurophysiology of attention more closely than before.
          At the same time, the questions that were at the center of eighteenth century
          and earlier discussions, the cognitive function of attention, are less
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          frequently posed, and the functioning of attention in higher cognition is less
          frequently discussed.  As many authors have observed, "attention" now defines
          a complex field of research that may or may not be unified by a single
          underlying process or set of phenomena.  It is less common now for a single
          author to attempt a systematic taxonomy of all the phenomena of attention.
          There is richness of results and of microtheory, but theoretical unification
          remains elusive.
                                     III. Concluding Remarks
               Examination of the early history of attention reveals that the chief
          phenomenal descriptive aspects of attention had been recorded by the
          seventeenth century.  The main overarching theoretical positions were
          formulated by the end of the eighteenth century, and the primary areas of
          experimental investigation by the end of the nineteenth.  Experimental
          technique has been much refined, and new instruments make possible fine-
          grained analyses of the psychophysics of attention.  These permit formulation
          of sophisticated questions about the temporal course, spatial distribution,
          and content-related characteristics of attentional processing.
               Titchener’s claim that research on attention was born with the "new"
          experimental psychology of the late nineteenth century is false.  His claim in
          fact differs markedly from the attitude of William James, who is now cited
          more prominently than Titchener on attention.  James (1890, ch. 11) referred
          freely to eighteenth-century works, including those of Wolff and Stewart.  The
          extent to which the theoretical context set by eighteenth-century psychology
          conditioned and controlled the psychology of Wundt, Titchener, and indeed
          James, and thereby set the context for twentieth-century psychology, is at
          present unknown.  This state of ignorance has largely resulted from the
          misbelief that scientific psychology is itself only slightly more than 100
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          years old.  For the case of attention, I hope to have shown that that
          contention is at least 150 years off the mark.
                                       Note on Translation
          Unless otherwise indicated all translations are the author’s.
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                                          Table Captions
          Table 1.  Comparison of standard topics in textbooks treating psychological
          topics, in the 17th century and in the period 1874-1911.  Attention and Laws
          of Association appear in the latter but not the former.  Category labels
          signify topical areas that may be named otherwise in the original textbook.
          Only the main common areas are shown.
          Table 2.  Early occurrences of phenomenological descriptions of various
          aspects of attention, as reported by Neumann (1971) and as found in the
          present study (Hatfield).  Neumann does not include Involuntary Shifts as a
          category of phenomenological description.  Neumann’s original German terms are
          provided in the discussion.
          Table 3.  Data showing W. Stanley Jevons’ estimates of the number of black
          beans thrown into a white paper box at the moment at which the beans came to
          rest, in comparison with the actual number of beans thrown.  Reproduced from
          Jevons (1871).
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          Table 1.
             Standard Psychological Topics in Textbooks
          On soul or mind, 17th c.    Psychology, 1874-1911
           External senses                  ditto
           Neural Structures                ditto
             and Processes
           Internal Senses:
             Memory & Imagination      Memory & Imagination
                   ---                     Attention
                   ---                 Laws of Association
           Higher Cognition:
             Judgment, Reasoning             ditto
           Bodily Motion                     ditto
           Appetite & Will                   ditto
          Table 2.
          Phenomenological Descriptions of Attention
          Neumann     Hatfield      Descriptive Aspect
          Aristotle    ditto        Narrowing
          Lucretius    ditto        Active Directing
            ---       Augustine     Involuntary Shifts
          Buridan     Arist./Lucr.  Clarity
          Descartes    ditto        Fixation over Time
          Descartes   Lucretius     Effector Sensitivity
          Leibniz     Descartes     Motivational Aspect
